

Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut:

On Halakhah and the Power of Stories

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Yom Haatzmaut, Israel Independence Day, is a time of festivity in Israel and for Jews around the world. And with the exception of *haredi* communities, for whom the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state prior to the Messianic age (*bi'at hamashiah*) is not - to put it mildly - an occasion for rejoicing, the day has taken on religious expression as well. Thus, many of the restrictions of the period of "*s'firah*" (the counting of the Omer) are removed for Yom Haatzmaut.¹ In addition, the day is represented in the liturgies of Jewish communities from across the religious spectrum, whether in the form of special services or of additions to the weekday service. One of the latter is the recitation of the complete Hallel (*Hallel shalem*; Psalms 113-118) after the conclusion of the morning *t'filah*. This lends to Yom Haatzmaut something of the festive atmosphere of the other days on which *Hallel shalem* is recited:

Bavli Ta'anit 28b

אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי שמעון בן יהוצדק: שמונה עשר יום בשנה יחיד גומר בהן את הלל, ואלו הן: שמונת ימי החג, ושמונת ימי חנוכה, ויום טוב הראשון של פסח, ויום טוב של עצרת.

R. Yochanan said in the name of R. Shimeon b. Yehotzdak: An individual (*yahid*) is obligated to recite Hallel on eighteen days [in the land of Israel]: eight days of Sukkot and Sh'mini Atzeret; eight days of Hanukkah; the first festival day of Pesah; and the festival day of Shavuot.²

For those who recite Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut, the question arises: do we say it with the *b'rakhot* that traditionally precede and follow the Hallel? This is no minor ritual detail but the subject of a long-standing *mahloket* among Orthodox *poskim*, and it isn't hard to understand why. There is, of course, no objection to reciting any segment of the Book of Psalms, including chapters 13 through 118, on any day that one wishes. But when we accompany that recitation with *b'rakhot*, when we say "אשר קגשנו במצותיו וציונו לקרוא את ההלל", we turn it into a religious obligation, declaring that God or the Torah or the Rabbis (see below) have "sanctified us through *mitzvot* and commanded/instructed us" to perform this act. If we can say that with integrity, then we make an important theological statement, namely that Yom Haatzmaut marks a moment of Divine deliverance for the Jewish people and therefore partakes of the sanctity of the festivals and Hanukkah, days on which we recite the Hallel *with* the *b'rakhot*. Are we, whether as individuals or as communities, permitted under *halakhah* to make such a statement?³

A New Takkanah?

Progressive halakhists who favor reciting the *b'rakhot* could point to a neat and simple path to a solution. They'd begin with Rambam, *Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Megillah V'Hanukkah* 3:6:

לא הלל של חנוכה בלבד הוא שמדברי סופרים אלא קריאת ההלל לעולם מדברי סופרים בכל הימים
שגומרין בהן את ההלל

Not only is the Hallel recited on Hanukkah an ordinance of the Rabbis, but the recitation of Hallel on every day that one is obligated to complete it is an ordinance of the Rabbis.⁴

The “Rabbis” he mentions are the members of the ancient Sanhedrin or *beit din hagadol* who according to tradition were empowered to enact ordinances (*takkanot*) that were binding upon all Israel. These ordinances are often designated as “Rabbinic commandments” (*mitzvot mid'rabanan*), and it is appropriate to recite *b'rakhot* when performing them.⁵ It was those “Rabbis” who instructed us concerning the proper occasions to say Hallel. Perhaps a similar rabbinic body, say the Rabbinical Assembly or the Central Conference of American Rabbis, can issue a similar instruction and ordain that we recite *b'rakhot* over the Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut. Or not, of course. Some liberal rabbis may think it inappropriate to declare the founding of the secular state of Israel an act of God’s redemptive power in Jewish history. Alternatively, the *takkanah* might simply leave the choice to each community or individual. That’s the thing about *takkanot*: as legislative edicts they rest entirely upon the will of the legislator and do not have to be justified by appeal to the sources.

The problem with this “easy” solution is that Orthodox and other traditionalist halakhic thinkers would reject as sheer arrogance the idea that any contemporary body of rabbis exercises the authority of the ancient Sanhedrin. Not a few progressive halakhists would agree with them, and they may well be uncomfortable with the notion that rabbis today can authorize *b'rakhot* for occasions not specified by the tradition.

It would be better to make a stronger argument - if possible - one that has a chance of speaking to Jews in all camps. That answer would assert that we don’t need a *takkanah* because the existing *halakhah* permits the recitation of *b'rakhot* over Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut. That, indeed, is what the long-standing *mahloket* is all about: those who recite the *b'rakhot* claim that the *halakhah* authorizes the practice, while those in the opposite camp deny that such a warrant exists.

Rabbi Ovadyah Yosef: Hallel Yes, B'rakhot No

We want to consider that dispute here. Perhaps the best way to do that is to consider the ruling of one of the most prominent among the *poskim* who have addressed the subject. We’re talking about Rabbi Ovadyah Yosef, the eminent S’fardic authority and former chief rabbi who died in 2013. Rabbi Yosef’s *t’shuvah* (*Resp. Yabi`a Omer*, v. 6, *Orah Hayyim* no. 41) is, as is usually the case with his writing, comprehensive, well-sourced and carefully reasoned. It is also firm and

decisive: on the basis of several major arguments, Yosef concludes that the *halakhah* clearly prohibits the recitation of *b'rakhot*. It is in our judgment the strongest case yet made in support of that prohibition. On what basis in Jewish law does that case rely? We want to look at the arguments and the reasoning that Rabbi Yosef brings to bear, as a way of answering one central question: how do we *know* that the *halakhah* either prohibits or permits the recitation of *b'rakhot* over Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut?

Rabbi Yosef begins his analysis with a pivotal text from *B. P'sahim* 117a:

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלל זה מי אמרו? חכמים אומרים: נביאים שביניהן תיקנו להם לישראל שיהיו אומרים אותו על כל פרק ופרק, ועל כל צרה וצרה שלא תבא עליהם לישראל, ולכשנגאלין אומרים אותו על גאולתן.

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: who originated the recitation of the Hallel? The Sages tell us that the prophets ordained that the Jews would recite it at every important event and over every danger that should befall them (may that not happen!). Once they are redeemed, they shall recite it over their redemption.

We are told that the prophets, acting in their rabbinic capacity,⁶ enacted a *takkanah* that prescribed the recitation of Hallel over the “redemption” from “every danger.” As Rashi explains, the festival of Hanukkah, which celebrates the military victory that reestablished Jewish national sovereignty, is an example of such a deliverance. It’s not difficult to draw an analogy from Hanukkah to Yom Haatzmaut, which of course marks another military victory that achieved political independence.

But Rabbi Yosef rejects the analogy. When the Talmud (*B. Ta'anit* 28b, above) tells us that the individual (*yaḥid*) is obligated by that prophetic *takkanah* to recite Hallel on certain days, it means *only* on those days. How do we know this? He cites a passage from the 9th-century Geonic compendium *Halakhot G'dolot* (ch. 15, *Hil. Lulav*, p. 209):

כל אימת דלא כניפין כולהון ישראל יחיד קארי להון. והא דקא מפיק להון בלשון יחיד, משום דכד כניפין כולהון ישראל ובעי למימר הלל כל יומא על כל צרה שנגאלין ממנה אמרי

Any assembly of Jews that does not include the entire people of Israel is called “*yaḥid*.” The reason they are called *yachid* is that when the entire people of Israel wishes to say Hallel on a day that they were delivered from danger, they may say it.

Which teaches us, says Rabbi Yosef, that the prophetic *takkanah* (*B. P'sahim* 117a) does not refer to “individuals” or even large segments of the Jewish people:

ולמדנו מדברי קדשו שתקנת הנביאים היתה דוקא באופן שהצרה באה על כל ישראל, וכשנגאלין ממנה יהיו אומרים הלל על גאולתם ועל פדות נפשם.... אבל צבור או אפילו מדינה שלמה של ישראל שנגאלו מצרתם, אינם רשאים לקבוע הלל בברכות, אבל נכון לומר הלל בלא ברכה.

The *takkanah* applied only to situations when the entire people of Israel experienced danger. When they were delivered from that danger, they recited Hallel over that deliverance... But when a community (*tzibur*) or even an entire city or state (*m'dinah*) of Jews are rescued from danger, they are not entitled to establish a recitation of Hallel with *b'rakhot*, though they may properly recite Hallel without a *b'rakhah*.

Yosef cites a long list of *rishonim* who agree with this assessment. The remarks of R. Menachem HaMeiri (*Beit Hab'hirah, P'sahim* 117a) are a representative sample:

כל יחיד שאירעתהו צרה ונגאל הימנה רשאי לקבוע הלל לעצמו באותו יום בכל שנה אלא שאינו מברך עליו וכן הדין בכל ציבור וציבור כך היה יסוד נביאים לאמרו על כל צרה וצרה כשנגאלים ממנה.

Any individual (*yahid*) who experiences a redemption from danger is entitled to establish a practice of reciting Hallel on that day every year. But that person should not recite a *b'rakhah* over that Hallel. The same is true for every community, for thus was the ordinance established by the prophets.

It's clear where Rabbi Yosef is going with this: since the deliverance we celebrate on Yom Haatzmaut happened only to the Jews living in Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) at the time, then it doesn't qualify as a redemption for "all Israel." Thus, Jews who wish to recite Hallel on that day are considered *yahid* and are not *obligated* to say the Hallel. They may do so if they choose, but they may not recite *b'rakhot* over it.

The obvious problem with this position is that we say Hallel on Hanukkah *with* the *b'rakhot*, even though the Hasmonean wars that led to the recovery of Jewish political sovereignty affected only those Jews living in the land of Israel. But it's not a *big* problem for Yosef, who cites several writers to the effect that because Hanukkah involves the recapture and rededication of the Temple, "it is considered a salvation of the entire Jewish people" (הצלת כל ישראל מקרי). The Temple was indeed a special place, and given that עיני כל ישראל נשואות אליו נחשב כאילו נעשה - לכל ישראל "the eyes of all Israel were turned toward it, the miracle is considered to have been performed for all Israel." Thus,

ומעתה נראה שהואיל והנסים שנעשו לנו במלחמת הקוממיות שהצילנו השי"ת מידי אויבינו ושונאינו שזממו להכחידנו, וה' הפר עצתם, כי גבר עלינו חסדו, כיון שלא היה הנס לכל ישראל, אפשר שנכון לומר הלל, אבל בלי ברכה. כמ"ש המאירי וכל הראשונים הנ"ל.

...because the miracles that were performed for us in the War of Independence, when God saved us from enemies who sought to destroy us... were not performed for the entire people of Israel, it is perhaps appropriate to say the Hallel, but [one should do so] without the *b'rakhot*, following the opinion of HaMeiri and all the *rishonim* I have cited.

This sounds like a conclusion, but Rabbi Yosef isn't finished. In the fashion of traditional *poskim*, he adds two additional arguments to help support his ruling. The first goes to the nature of the “miracles” and the “redemption” that we celebrate in our observance of Yom Haatzmaut.

ויש להוסיף עוד טעם שאין לברך על ההלל ביום העצמאות, הגם שזכינו בעזה"י לגבור על אויבינו ושונאינו שהיו רבים ועצומים, ומצויידיים במיטב הנשק והתחמושת, ולמרות הכל המה כרעו ונפלו... אלא הטעם משום שנס זה אינו יוצא מגדר הטבע, שאין אומרים הלל על נסים נסתרים אשר הקדוש ברוך הוא עושה עמנו בכל עת, משא"כ נס פך השמן שהוא יוצא מגדר הטבע, ולכן תקנו הלל בימי חנוכה.

Another reason for not reciting *b'rakhot* over Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut: even though God enabled us to triumph over enemies who outnumbered us and were better equipped than us, that “miracle” did not involve a suspension of the natural order. We don't recite Hallel over the “miracles” that the Holy One performs for us every day. In this way Yom Haatzmaut differs from Hanukkah, where the miracle of the cruse of oil was indeed supernatural, and for that reason the Sages ordained the recitation of Hallel during Hanukkah.

That is, while the Maccabees' victory over a more powerful foe was certainly unexpected, it was hardly the sort of wonder that we usually define as a “miracle” because it defies natural explanation. The actual “miracle” of Hanukkah was the cruse of oil that burned for eight days. We know this because the Talmud (*B. Shabbat* 21b) recounts this story in a passage that begins with the words מאי חנוכה, “what is Hanukkah?”, which Rashi explains: על איזה נס קבעוה, “over which miracle did the Sages establish the observance?” The *miracle*, in other words, is the oil that burned for eight days and *not* the military victory itself. Obviously, no such miraculous occurrence attaches to Yom Haatzmaut, which is all about Israel's declaration of independence and the military victory that secured the state's existence.

The second additional argument goes to the nature of the “redemption” that we celebrate on Israel Independence Day.

ומלבד כל זה יש לומר כי הן אמנם רבים ועצומים מגדולי ישראל רואים בהקמת המדינה אתחלתא דגאולה... מכל מקום הואיל ועדיין **רב הדרך לפנינו** כדי להגיע אל המנוחה ואל הנחלה, הן מבחינה מדינית וצבאית, והן מבחינה מוסרית ורוחנית, לפיכך אין לחייב לגמור ההלל בברכה.

And while many great rabbis regard the founding of the state of Israel as “the dawning of our redemption” (*athalta d'g'ulah*)... even so, the road is long until that task is fully realized, politically, militarily, ethically, or spiritually. Thus, we should not establish an obligation to recite Hallel with *b'rakhot*.

The bolded words in this passage - **רב הדרך לפנינו** - literally, “we have a long way to go” - are the key to Yosef's point. The political sovereignty we gained in 1947-1949 is, at best, one step on an extended journey toward the final goal, for surely we cannot speak of the state of Israel as “redeemed.” After all, he says, despite the establishment of the state we have still had to fight

wars for our survival. We are surrounded by enemies; many of the nations that were once friendly toward us have turned their backs upon us. The streets of Israel are filled with immodestly-clad women; pornography is readily available; the majority of the country violates Shabbat and ignores the laws of *kashrut*. Yom Haatzmaut cannot be compared to Hanukkah, which celebrates a time when “all the Jews recognized that Divine providence had saved them, and all of them worshipped God in true faith” (אין לזה כל דמיון לנס חנוכה שכל העם הכירו וידעו) (בהשגחת השי"ת עליהם, וכולם היו עובדי ה' באמת ובתמים). Thus, our redemption is but a partial one; it does not deserve a Hallel with *b'rakhot*.

P'sak Halakhah and the Stories We Tell

It isn't our intention to argue against this *p'sak* (ruling) of Rabbi Ovadyah Yosef. His reasoning is sound, and his conclusion follows closely upon it. We simply wish to point out that his halakhic arguments, as firm as they may be, are grounded in *stories*. That is to say, those arguments make sense primarily because they come to us encased in a narrative recounting of ancient and contemporary Jewish history. Rabbi Yosef adopts those narratives, but it is crucial to note that he could have adopted others. And had he preferred those other stories, those other accounts of Jewish history, his *p'sak* would have differed.

We are not saying that *agadah* (a good Hebrew equivalent for “stories” and “narrative”) determines the *halakhah*. Nor are we saying that there is no real difference between the two. On the contrary: *agadah* and *halakhah* are distinct genres of meaning-making in Judaism, and each of them works according to its own accepted rules and procedures. What we're saying here comes much closer to the insights of contemporary legal theorists that law and narrative are “mutually inherent,”⁷ that entire legal institutions are based upon narrative constructions, that the activity called law is steeped in storytelling, and that it is impossible to purge the latter from the former.⁸ Perhaps the most famous formulation of this idea is that of Robert Cover:⁹

No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live. In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related. Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse – to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose. And every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.

In these words, some will see (rightly, we think) echoes of Chaim Nachman Bialik, who in a memorable essay entitled “*Halakhah v'Agadah*” describes the genres as “two facets of a single entity,” related to each other “as words are related to thought and impulse, or as a deed and its material form are to expression. Halakhah is the concretization, the necessary end product of *agadah*; *agadah* is *halakhah* become fluid again.”¹⁰ For our purposes, the point is that *halakhah* cannot be fully understood apart from the stories that its sages and decision-makers tell about the

world and about our place in it. It follows, then, that there will be times when we simply cannot distinguish between the formal, black-letter rules of *halakhah* and the stories that stand behind them. We should not be surprised, then, that those stories will figure, sometimes explicitly and sometimes not, in the decisions (*p'sak*) that halakhists render.

In this case, the stories figure explicitly.

Let's look at Rabbi Yosef's first major argument, namely that the prophetic *takkanah* establishing the recitation of Hallel "applied only to situations when the entire people of Israel experienced danger." That counts as a formal, black-letter rule of *halakhah*, supported by the many *rishonim* he cites. But that rule by itself is insufficient to answer our question, because we have to decide whether it applies to Israel's War of Independence. That decision requires a judgment on the part of the *posek* - did the events of 1947-1949 constitute a redemption of *all* Israel? - and that judgment cannot be made in the absence of the story that the *posek* tells about the significance of the war's outcome. For Rabbi Yosef, the war affected only those Jews living in Eretz Yisrael at the time. But it is just as reasonable to tell a different story, according to which the *entire* Jewish people benefited from the victory, that the existence of a sovereign Jewish state transformed the nature of Jewish life for Jews in all lands. If you tell that latter story, you will be more inclined to decide in favor of reciting *b'rakhot* over Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut.

Much of Rabbi Yosef's *p'sak* rests on his rejection of the analogy between Yom Haatzmaut and Hanukkah. Again, this is a characteristic move in halakhic analysis: we reason by analogy (דימוי (מילתא למילתא)), trying to find an answer to a question by comparing it to other rules or fact situations for which we already have an answer, and we are entitled to reject a comparison - as Rabbi Yosef does here - when we find it unpersuasive. But let's be aware that his rejection is based upon particular stories he tells about Hanukkah that lead to debatable conclusions:

- *Hanukkah was a time of redemption for "all Israel" because it involved the Temple, while the political sovereignty of Yom Haatzmaut does not involve kol yisrael.* We, of course, can tell a different story about what Jewish national sovereignty means to us in our day and time. When we do, the analogy is supported.
- *We recite Hallel on Hanukkah with b'rakhot because of a supernatural miracle (the cruse of oil) and not because of the military victory of the Maccabees.* That narrative is based in the Talmud (*B. Shabbat* 21b). But we could point to the *al hanisim* paragraph that we insert into the *t'filah* and *birkat hamazon* during Hanukkah. That passage does not mention the miracle of the oil. It rather describes the military victory, which it attributes to God's redemptive power and over which it has been ordained להודות ולהלל לשמך הגדול, "to give thanks and praise (*l'hallel*) to Your great name." According to *that* story, we recite Hallel on Hanukkah - *with* the *b'rakhot* - over a redemption that occurred through "natural" means. The analogy to Yom Haatzmaut is clear.
- *Hanukkah, unlike Yom Haatzmaut, celebrates a complete redemption.* It is certainly true that the people as a whole were more religiously observant during the days of the Maccabees than during our own secular age. But from what we know of the history of the

Hasmonean dynasty, the scourge of Hellenism (if we wish to see it that way) hardly disappeared with the gaining of independence. Given the corruption that plagued the monarchy and the priesthood, along with the ever-increasing influence of Rome in the affairs of the state - it was hardly a golden age of Jewish history - we could in all honesty tell the story that describes the redemption as “partial.” Yet we recite Hallel on Hanukkah with *b’rakhoh*.

Ultimately, Rabbi Yosef forbids *b’rakhoh* for the Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut *precisely* because of the stories that he tells. According to his narrative of contemporary Jewish life we still live in spiritual exile, whether we happen to reside in Eretz Yisrael or in the Diaspora. In that story, whatever good has resulted from the rebirth of Jewish statehood, the glass is always half-empty. Until the Messiah comes, or until the preponderant majority of the people become Orthodox, or until a halakhic regime replaces the existing secular democratic state of Israel, Yom Haatzmaut will not deserve a Hallel with *b’rakhoh*. He is entitled to tell that story, but the *halakhah* does not require that we make it our own. Our story differs from his. True, we agree that the people of Israel have not yet achieved full redemption. But as we understand and recount our history, we have *always* been on a journey toward that end, that *takhlit*. In our story, the glass is half-full; the very creation and existence of the state works a transformative power upon all Jews everywhere, a power that outweighs all the problems and defects that we acknowledge in its functioning.

Which is why there can be no objection to reciting Hallel on Yom Haatzmaut along with the *b’rakhoh*.

1. See *The Koren Talpiot Siddur* (Jerusalem: Koren Publishers, 2009), p. 648, par. 258; *Siddur Rinat Yisrael* (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 630 (“בימים זה אין נוהגים מנהגי אבלות של ימי הספירה”); Rabbinical Assembly, “[Yom Ha`atzmaut: Laws and Customs](#)” (accessed May 3, 2022).

2. You’ll notice that the second festival day of the Diaspora is missing from this list. The Talmud in fact goes on to add that in the Diaspora one recites the Hallel on the eighth day of Pesah, the second day of Shavuot, and the second day of Sh’mini Atzeret, for a total of twenty-one days.

3. It’s notable that the sources cited in note 1, above, all finesse this question. They provide that *Hallel shalem* be recited but make no mention of whether it should be accompanied with the *b’rakhoh*.

4. In the very next paragraph (3:7). Rambam tells us that the recitation of Hallel on Rosh Hodesh is a *minhag* (see *B. Ta’anit* 28b) and therefore does not take a *b’rakhah*. Rabad already disagrees: we *do* recite *b’rakhoh* over the Hallel on Rosh Hodesh (*Hil. B’rakhoh* 11:16), and that is our practice today; see Isserles, *Orah Hayyim* 422:2).

5. For example, to recite a *b’rakhah* over the kindling the Hanukkah lamp; see *B. Shabbat* 23a.

6. See Rambam’s Introduction to the *Mishneh Torah*, which describes leading Biblical figures as heads of the supreme *beit din* of their generation. And see *B. Megillah* 17b: מאה ועשרים זקנים ובהם כמה נביאים תיקנו שמונה עשרה ברכות על הסדר.

7. The phrase is that of Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, *Literary Criticisms of Law* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 261.

8. A very partial list: Binder and Weisberg (see preceding note); Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz, eds., *Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); David R. Papke, "Discharge as Denouement: Appreciating the Storytelling of Appellate Opinions," *Journal of Legal Education* 40 (1990), pp. 145-159; L. H. LaRue, *Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); and Robin West, "Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory," *New York University Law Review* 60 (1985), 145-211. On how these theoretical insights might apply to rabbinical decision making, see Mark Washofsky, "Narratives of Enlightenment: On the Use of the 'Captive Infant' Story by Recent Halakhic Authorities," in Walter Jacob editor, in association with Moshe Zemer, *Napoleon's Influence on Jewish Law: The Sanhedrin of 1807 and Its Modern Consequences* (Pittsburgh: Solomon B. Freehof Institute of Progressive Halakhah, 2007), pp. 95-147.

9. Robert Cover, "Nomos and Narrative," *Harvard Law Review* 97 (1984), at pp. 4-5. And see James Boyd White, *From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003) pp. 32-33: "Whenever a lawyer speaks she both tells a story and claims a meaning for it... In claiming a meaning for the story that he tells, the lawyer must make use of the existing body of cases, statutes, understandings, and rules that we call the law, which exists, before he organizes it into argument, simply as raw material for him and his adversary, full of obscurity and contradiction and uncertainty. In making his argument he revives and reorganizes – he reconstitutes – this cultural inheritance, creating a new version of it in competition with another mind."

¹⁰ Chaim Nachman Bialik, *Kol Kitvei C. N. Bialik* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1935), pp. 260ff. The full text is available at the Ben-Yehudah Project, <https://benyehuda.org/read/8585> . An English translation by Leon Simon is available at https://masorti.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Bialik_Halacha_and_Aggadah-1.pdf .